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52
A significant amount of research has been conducted determining the amount of fuel tax evasion 53 (FTE) that the nation faces and in trying to control or minimize this problem. As early as mid-54 1980s, federal and state tax officials in conjunction with industry representatives assessed the 55 losses to the federal government due to FTE at $1 billion per year [1] . In the same report, the 56 Government Accountability Office (GAO) identifies the most prevalent methodology to evade 57 fuel taxes at that time a scheme named "daisy chaining." This method involved a company buying fuel tax free, selling that fuel to other companies in the organization implementing this 59 scheme, and finally selling the fuel to a retailer as tax-paid fuel but not submitting the tax 60 collected to the IRS. If the scheme was discovered the last company selling the fuel did not have 61 any assets or ceased operations making it impossible for the IRS to collect the taxes. The 62 counter measure to this was to move the point of taxation up in the distribution system so a lower 63 number of companies would be involved making it easier for the government to audit these 64 transactions.
65
In response to this, numerous other schemes of FTE started to appear, or became more 66 evident. A NCHRP Report 623 [2] describes in detail many of these schemes, including: 67 bootlegging across state lines (i.e., fuel is bought in state A which has a lower fuel tax than a 68 neighbor state B where it is sold without filing the proper "export" documentation; the 69 differential in fuel tax is the amount evaded); false claim of export (i.e., a reverse of the previous 70 scheme); cocktailing (i.e., blending taxable and non-taxable fuels and collecting fuel tax for the 71 entire load; the fuel-tax per gallon times the number of non-taxable fuel gallons blended is the 72 amount of tax evaded); failure to splash dye (i.e., when the terminal equipment is 73 malfunctioning, a tank trucker can purchase fuel as tax free-e.g., for construction or farming 74 equipment usage-but needs to add the dye directly to the tank for blending; not adding the dye to 75 the fuel, the tax evaded is the amount of tax not paid at the terminal); failure to remit tax 76 payments (tax-free fuel is purchased and sold as tax paid, but the tax collected is not remitted to 77 the corresponding tax collection agency); and other schemes. 
System Architecture
128
The architecture of the system included discrete, trailer-borne valve and hatch sensors to monitor system may be cost-prohibitive for a production system, its inclusion in the testing allowed the 136 researchers to conduct a cursory analysis of the quality and utility that such a system provides 137 regarding estimates of fuel loading and offloading. 
145
A user interface was deployed on the device to allow the driver to enter fuel-related 146 information consisting of fuel type, fuel quantity, destination of the load, diversion number (if 147 the destination was changed after loading the tanker), bill-of-lading number, and other parameters. This interface was also used to convey any alerts to the driver. Also deployed on 149 the on-board telematics device was an application named the on-board Evidentiary Reasoning System, or obERS. This application merged all the information collected by the different sensors 151 deployed (valve, hatch, weight, and spatial location sensors, as well as vehicle kinetic state) and 152 driver input.
153
The central part of Figure 1 shows two other sub-components of the system which 154 resided in the telematics provider back-office system (TBOS): (1) the back-office Evidentiary
155
Reasoning System (boERS) and (2) at the TBOS; and (3) a sensor malfunctioning alert (a faulty sensor) added to the on-board fuel 169 logs and later added to the CI. All the alerts were also included into the fuel log file together 170 with any action taken by the driver (only for safety alerts). Information from shipping 171 documents entered by the driver through the on-board device interface was geo-coded and added 172 to the fuel log file. Those log files were sent at given intervals to the TBOS and temporarily 173 stored to be processed at a time when the boERS determined that the shift for that particular 174 driver had ended and all the corresponding fuel logs had been received (see Figure 1 ).
175
The boERS application was "called" at periodic intervals by the operating system running 176 on the TBOS. The application then processed all the fuel logs that were ready and generated, for 177 each compartment and location, a determination of whether the tanker was being loaded or 178 offloaded (by taking into consideration the information from the weight sensors), the valve 179 operation sequence (each compartment has two valves, a so called "belly valve" or emergency 180 valve, and the primary valve, which need to be open simultaneously for fuel to flow in either 181 direction), and the elapsed time during which fuel was flowing. These valve sequences and fuel-182 flow elapsed times were used as input to a proprietary self-learning algorithm that determined the 183 likelihood of the occurrence of FTE for these observed events for a driver compared with his/her 184 past history, and compared against the rest of the drivers in the organization. If that likelihood 185 was low (and "low" as well as other thresholds can be defined by the carrier), it was noted in the 186 driver report which was the output of the boERS application.
187
The boERS self-learning algorithms also analyzed the elapsed times and sequencing of The boERS also checked the locations at which fuel loading, fuel offloading and hatch 194 opening happened against a database of authorized (by the carrier) locations for that activity.
195
Any operation that occurred at an unauthorized location or at a location that was not in the database of authorized locations was added to the driver report and noted in the CI for further 197 processing (e.g., adding the location to the database of authorized locations for that particular 198 activity, or further investigating the event). The CI also allowed the dispatcher or a manager to 199 attach fuel-diversion numbers to any activity when required (the boERS determined which 200 offloading operations needed a fuel diversion number by comparing the driver's input destination 201 when the fuel for that compartment was loaded to the actual location where the fuel was 202 offloaded. If those locations disagreed and state borders were crossed, then the boERS noted this 203 in the driver report).
204
The carrier had one week to revise the driver report and add any missing information 205 (e.g., fuel diversion numbers) or make corrections to the driver reports. At the end of the seven-206 day period since first created, the driver report was processed to eliminate information not 207 relevant to tax auditors (e.g., valve sequencing) and a fuel audit report file generated and 208 transmitted to the FDAS (see Figure 1) .
209
The FDAS archives the fuel logs received from the carrier as its main purpose to allow There this "raw" information was processed by the boERS application generating the driver 231 reports and, with the input from the carrier when needed, the FDAS reports.
232
The fuel logs, driver reports, and FDAS reports were uploaded daily to an ORNL ftp (file 233 transfer protocol) server for archiving and analysis, as well as determining if any system was 234 malfunctioning. This ftp server is not an integral part of the system tested, but rather it was 235 deployed during the test as a research tool. The information was also stored on the TBOS 236 databases (driver reports, FDAS reports, tampering and sensor malfunctioning alerts) and on the 237 FDAS database (FDAS reports only).
General Statistics
240
During the pilot test, over 1,300 fuel logs were submitted from the three instrumented vehicles 241 and processed by the boERS application. The data was collected during normal operations and the twelve drivers that drove these vehicles during the pilot test were trained and were also 243 supplied a "quick reference" guide on how to input the fuel data on the on-board device (the 244 valve and hatch sensors did not alter the way these elements were operated so no training was 245 needed). Part of the pilot test was conducted during the winter of 2015, and snow and road-246 deicing chemicals adversely affected the first generation of the wires and sensors connections 247 deployed on the vehicles, mostly due a defective manufacturing process. Additionally, the 248 T2TCU enclosures leaked causing corrosion on the circuit boards. These defects had to be 249 corrected and the hardware hardened and replaced. As a consequence of this, there was a period 250 of time in which some of the instrumented vehicles were not able to collect data. This problem 251 was more acute for two of the three instrumented vehicles. These two vehicles collected about Table 1 shows the volume of fuel hauled during a randomly selected period of time by Table 1 ) and the driver had to select one 281 of those when loading and offloading. Mistakes were made when selecting these types of 282 blended fuels which resulted in some mislabeled fuel types. This error, however, can be easily 283 found by using the FDAS interface.
284
The FTE prevention solution tested in this research had state-level tax auditors as its main 285 focus. However, the technology will have to be adopted by the fuel carriers and therefore the 286 solution has to address the needs of fuel-hauling companies and their customers. Carriers' main 287 concerns include misdelivery or cross contamination (i.e., a delivery of a product to the wrong storage tank which renders the entire stored amount as contaminated and not saleable to the 289 customer), "cocktailing" (e.g., by adding waste oils or other used products to the fuel through the 290 compartment hatch), and fuel theft. Although the solution deployed does not address the cross-291 contamination issue, it is an essential first step in that direction. The other two issues, 292 cocktailing and fuel theft, were taken into consideration when the architecture of the system was 293 designed. Sensors in the hatches allowed the obERS to recognize when one of those were 294 opened (always a suspicious activity, unless it happens at locations where maintenance is 295 performed on the tanker). In cases where a hatch was opened, a tampering alert was submitted 296 from the vehicle in real-time to the TBOS and made immediately available to the 297 carrier/dispatcher. Based on the location where this alert was triggered, the carrier could then 298 take the appropriate action. In a similar way, any sensor that became disconnected (including 299 valve and hatch sensors, and tractor and trailer data bus connections) obERS generated a 300 tampering alert conveyed in real-time to the carrier through the TBOS CI.
301
Addressing the fuel-theft issue was a more complicated problem since this activity can 302 happen during normal operations (opening and closing of valves) and needed to be differentiated were also combined (e.g., aggregated for all the drivers that have driven vehicle v) and used by 316 the boERS algorithms to assess the likelihood of occurrence for the observed event fft.
317
Probability thresholds, set up by the carrier, determined how to classify these observed events.
318 Table 2 shows the parameters defining the fuel-flowing elapsed time distributions for 319 loading and offloading activities for selected drivers and tanker compartment. The data to build 320 the distributions shown in Table 2 was selected at random and was a sub-set of the data collected 321 during the pilot test. Because elapsed-time cannot be negative, a log-normal distribution was and that was also captured by the means and standard deviations of these distributions.
326
Each observation of a fuel flowing event was assessed by the obERS. Consider, for 327 example, an observed fuel-flowing elapsed time fft = 241 seconds for compartment 3. Assume 328 also that the carrier has established the following probabilities thresholds: (1) normal event: 329 probability of being observed >= 60 %; (2) unlikely event: probability of being observed 330 between 40% and 60%; (3) rare event: probability of being observed < 40%. Overall, the system was easy to operate for the drivers. The valve operations were not 358 impeded by the deployed sensors, so no new skills were needed to operate the tanker trailer.
359
Fuel information (quantity, type, bill of lading number, destination, etc.) had to be entered 360 manually by the drivers at the terminal and at the offloading location (although at the latter 361 location, nothing had to be typed since the interface "remembered" what was entered at the 362 rack). Some errors were made by drivers who entered the information incorrectly, especially in 363 some low-occurrence cases (e.g., buying fuel at two different terminals for the same customer 364 and shipment).
365
The boERS identified those cases and noted them in the driver reports so the carrier could 366 correct the information before it was uploaded to the FDAS. But even in the case the 367 information was not corrected, the FDAS users could apply filters to find cases that were 368 abnormal. Furthermore, in cases where the technology is completely disconnected for a period 369 of time and the carrier does not submit any information from that vehicle, the FDAS would be 370 able to identify these gaps since odometer reading is one of the information elements submitted 371 in the reports to this system.
372
The solution presented here balances the needs of tax-auditors and those of the fuel-373 hauling companies and their customers. For tax-auditors it provides a quick way to find 374 anomalies in the tax information submitted to the system. It also allows tax-auditors to conduct 375 quick data analyses to better assess what is "normal operation" for a given carrier. For example, 376 in the discussion above we presented a carrier's distribution of fuel-shipment distance traveled.
377
The average distance traveled was much higher than what some fuel-tax auditors would consider regular. Therefore, for this particular carrier, long distances are not an indication of illicit 379 activities and it may be a waste of resources to audit that company simply based on that fact.
The cost of the deployment of the technology (except for the FDAS) has to be borne by 381 the carrier, so the technology has to provide incentives to the fuel hauling carriers to adopt it.
382
Those incentives were one of the focuses in the development of the solution presented here. 
